Introduction
In the late 1990s the UK government was involved in negotiating and drafting a new international environmental treaty, the United Nations Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
Known as "the Aarhus Convention" for the city in which it was signed in 1998 the treaty entered into force in 2001. The convention's signatories sought to extend procedural environmental rights -the right to participate in decision making, the right to access information and the right to access justice on environmental issues -to citizens and NGOs in 46 European countries. At the time, the UK government believed that it was largely compliant with the letter and the spirit of the international law it was signing. Like their Western European counterparts this treaty was largely understood by UK elites as a way to help Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) achieve environmental democracy in the wake of the collapse of the iron curtain. As such, the changes needed to bring the UK into line with the treaty and the costs of domestic compliance in the UK were seen to be minimal.
However, fifteen years later, after a decade of critical scrutiny by international tribunals and domestic courts, the UK was judged to be in systemic breach of the convention's provisions on access to justice. The UK has been the subject of more complaints in the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) than any other country. NGOs have launched a series of legal campaigns about the government's failures on access to justice and time and again international and domestic courts have found that the obligation to ensure that legal procedures are not prohibitively expensive has not been met. At the core of the problem are the ways in which the costs of litigation are structured. The cost rules in the English legal system mean that the loser in a legal case has to bear their opponents costs, known as the "loser-pays" system. This system makes litigation both expensive and risky; a party to a case does not know whether they will be responsible for their opponent 's costs and 3 what those costs will be upfront. The expense and uncertainty of this feature of the legal system were seen to be a major breach of the Aarhus Convention.
How did this happen? The system that structures legal opportunities in Britain has been significantly modified over recent years so as to make it easier and more affordable for citizens and NGOs to challenge government decision-making in environmental matters. How did procedural environmental rights that were designed to help Central and Eastern Europeans achieve environmental democracy eventually contribute to a re-shaping of the structure of legal opportunities in Britain?
This article offers a two-step answer to this question by bridging legal opportunity structure (LOS) theory with a social constructivist approach which examines what particular legal norms mean for different actors over time. First, the paper unpacks the motivations of Western European political actors in the development and negotiation phase of the Aarhus Convention. The research highlights the important role played by NGOs in the early phases of the development of the convention. I also show that the goal of diffusing procedural democratic rights in the CEECs, the Caucasus and Central Asia was a priority for Western European states. The aim of Western European elites was to support social movement organizations in states emerging from authoritarianism. Second, the paper explores how the meaning of Aarhus legal norms changed through a series of judicial interpretations of the Aarhus requirements offered by domestic and international courts and tribunals, partly on the prompting of environmental NGOs. Environmental groups and individual activists have harnessed the rights provisions of the Aarhus Convention in extensive litigation efforts in England and Scotland. In doing so, they have begun to use these rights -originally destined for others in the minds of signatories -to significantly shape the structure of opportunities for contesting decisions of the state in environmental policy back home. This article shows that 4 these civil society agents are not simply passive beneficiaries of rights but rather strategic actors that can demand, develop and shape access to justice from the bottom-up.
This case study helps to shed some light on how and why LOSs evolve over time, sometimes in unexpected ways. A rapidly growing literature has explored how the rules that shape legal opportunities can play an important role in constraining or incentivising civil society use of the courts. The existence of relevant legal stock, the rules determining access to the courts and the cost of litigation are all factors that shape the extent to which social movements are able to mobilize the law in pursuit of their social and political goals (Andersen 2006 , Hilson 2002 , Vanhala 2012 , 2017 . However, this literature has tended to ignore how and why opportunity structures might change over time.
This paper begins by surveying recent literature on how and why the LOS governing legal mobilization activity matters. It highlights some of the weaknesses with existing LOS theory and draws on a social constructivist approach to develop a framework for understanding institutional change in the case of the LOS. The following section discusses the research methods used to address the research questions and discusses the strengths and limitations of this case study. The analysis is divided into two sections. The first section introduces the Aarhus Convention and focuses on the motivations of different actors in the drafting of the convention. The second part of the analysis draws on two illustrative cases of legal mobilization activity by environmental NGOs in England and Scotland. It traces the changes in the LOS as a result of legal mobilization in both contexts over time. The article will conclude by drawing out some insights about the importance of considering international dimensions in thinking about LOSs and broader theoretical lessons about how LOSs change over time.
Legal Opportunity Structures: Review of the Literature
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Recent scholarship on social movements and their interaction with law and courts has deployed the notion of legal opportunity structure to account for why some civil society groups embrace legal tactics and others eschew them (Andersen 2006; Doherty and Hayes 2014; Hilson 2002; Vanhala 2012 Vanhala , 2016 Vanhala , 2017 . The focus is on the institutional incentives and constraints that shape a group's ability and/or willingness to sue. There are disagreements as to what constitutes part of the LOS and what does not (see Vanhala 2012 Vanhala , 2017 , but a consensus is emerging that at least three factors matter across jurisdictions and across policyareas: legal stock, standing rules and rules on costs. First, legal stock consists of the existing body of law and constrains the ways in which social movement organizations can articulate their claims if they want to be successful in the courtroom (Andersen 2006) . Second, scholars also agree that the regulations that limit or allow access to courts -the standing rules that regulate who can bring cases -are crucial in determining who mobilizes the law and who does not (Evans Case and Givens 2010; Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006) . Finally, the rules on who bears the costs in litigation also matter in shaping the opportunity structure for legal action. In the United States. the norm is that each party is responsible for bearing its own legal costs. Under the English rule, by contrast, the losing party pays the prevailing party's fees. This means that the risks and potential costs of litigating in the UK are generally much greater.
While this literature has developed a useful theoretical framework that can help to account for variations in legal mobilization across jurisdictions and across policy areas it has fallen short in three ways. First, this research has largely focused on the national legal opportunity structure as the unit of analysis and has tended to ignore the influence of international factors that might shape the legal landscape for social movement organizations (but see Simmons 2009 ). In a world where international law increasingly matters and where domestic law is being penetrated by international norms our theoretical frameworks should 6 take this into account. Existing research on how supranational law, such as EU provisions, offers important guidance here (see e.g. Hilson 2002 and Evans Case and Givens 2010) .
Second, this research has also tended to understand LOSs as a given. The LOS is almost always characterized as an "independent variable": the factor that explains a particular outcome be it why a group goes to court in the first place or what explains the ability of a group succeeding in their legal mobilization efforts. There has been relatively little research on how legal opportunity structures emerge in the first place and how and why they evolve over time (but see Evans Case and Givens 2010 and Vanhala 2012) . Third, social movement research has now moved beyond structure-agent paradigm debates. In order to adequately address questions about variation in social movement organization behaviour we need to examine both institutional and social contexts as well as the agency exerted by these organizations to shape the structures within which they are situated. Research should focus on the recursive relationship between structures and agents in order to explain agent behaviour but also to address the issue of structural change (Vanhala 2012) .
In order to address the research puzzle I rely on a social constructivist approach. This approach is concerned with how actors shape and respond to new ideas or norms -that is, shared conceptions of appropriate behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . Constructivism also accords an important role to non-state actors who are often seen as the shapers and carriers of new ideas or norms. A social constructivist approach is useful for addressing the research question here for two reasons. First, it allows scholars to understand the often implicit, ideational or rhetorical mechanisms of law as a driver of policy or social change.
Failing to analyze the different assumptions of actors as they affect the formulation, enforcement and implementation of new rights makes it harder for scholars to understand the potential content and direction of change. A second advantage of a constructivist approach is that it recognizes the inter-subjectivity of legal norms. This approach explicitly acknowledges 7 that the meaning of law is not a given: it is understood differently by different actors. The timing of interpretation can also contribute to the multi-valent character of law (Towns 2012; Schoenfeld 2010) .
Methods
To study the use of international legal norms by social movement actors to shape the LOS in The UK serves as an illuminating case for beginning to identify some of the conditions under which a LOS might change. The UK legal system -with its thousand year 8 history and its lack of a written constitution -is in many ways an "unlikely case" in terms of experiencing significant changes over a short-term period. The UK also offers the opportunity to delve into illustrative case studies of legal mobilization of Aarhus rights. The UK has three separate legal systems. English law and Northern Ireland law are both based on common-law principles and apply in England/Wales and Northern Ireland respectively. Scots law applies in Scotland and is a mixed system based on both common-law and civil-law principles. There is also a parallel civil society sector in the different jurisdictions. The Aarhus Convention is also unique in its reflection of the distinctive role of citizen groups and NGOs. Articles 4 to 9 regulate in a detailed manner the three pillars of the convention: (1) access to environmental information and collection and dissemination of environmental information; (2) public participation in decisions on specific activities, public participation concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment, and public participation during the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally binding normative instruments, and (3) access to justice. The third pillar of the Aarhus Convention, of particular focus here, is concerned with access to environmental justice. It grants rights to members of the public, including environmental organizations, to challenge the legality of decisions by public authorities that are contrary to the provisions of environmental legislation. Article 9(4) of the convention requires that procedures for rights of access must "provide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive."
In addition to the extensive rights granted to NGOs and individual citizens the Aarhus Convention is supported by a compliance body. At the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of 10 the convention in 2002 a mechanism to review compliance with the convention was adopted.
Several features of the Convention Compliance Committee are unique in international environmental law when compared to the compliance mechanisms of other multilateral environmental agreements (Koester 2007; Mason 2006) . The compliance mechanism can be triggered in four ways: (1) a party to the convention may make a submission to the committee about compliance by another party; (2) a party may make a submission to the Committee concerning its own compliance; (3) the secretariat may make a referral to the Committee; and finally and most notably (4) communications may be made to the committee by one or more members of the public concerning a party's compliance. Further, the Compliance Committee, rather than being composed of representatives of States, consists of nine independent experts serving in a personal capacity and there is the possibility for environmental organizations to nominate candidates for election to the committee. Two features of the way this tribunal operates -the direct recourse to the Compliance Committee and the input into the composition of the committee itself -grant NGOs unprecedented leverage vis-à-vis their states and the EU.
Drafting the Aarhus Convention
Environmental NGOs were involved at all stages of the convention drafting and negotiation process in a manner unprecedented in the development of international environmental law. Jeremy Wates writes "[i]ndeed, the initial idea of developing a UNECE convention on the theme was introduced by environmental NGOs" (Wates 2005, 10) . A coalition of environmental citizens' organizations from across Europe, that came to be known as the European ECO Forum, established a working group on public participation, led by the European Environmental Bureau (EEB). A convention on procedural rights became central to their demands and while there was little support from governments, the call for a convention was supported by other parties, such as the rapporteur of the Environment Committee of the 11 European Parliament (one of the most powerful committees within that institution) and the European Greens. Wates has argued that it was this support that ultimately "helped to persuade some of the more progressive governments, notably Denmark which was due to host the next conference, to push for the issue to be on the agenda for the next phase of the process" (Wates 2005, 10) .
NGOs were actively involved in the drafting of early versions of the convention. The Committee on Environmental Policy for the UNECE in establishing the mandate of the working group charged with preparing the draft convention deemed that NGOs should be invited to participate "as appropriate". Thus before negotiations got under way the UNECE secretariat convened a small group of "friends of the secretariat", including those from the ECO forum, to assist it in preparing a first draft. Jeremy Wates elaborates that when the negotiations began, NGOs participated to an extent hitherto unprecedented in the development of any international law….they were invited to intervene on a basis more or less equal to that on which government delegations participated, having considerable input to and influence upon the resulting text…The tradition of NGO participation continued uninterrupted into the implementation phase (Wates 2005, 10) .
Interview and documentary evidence suggests that policy-makers in Western
European states tended to understand the Aarhus Convention and compliance procedures as a mechanism to diffuse environmental democratic rights abroad. For them, the Aarhus Convention was a tool to embed procedural justice and empower the green movement in countries that were making the transition to democratic systems of governance. Interviewees suggested that actors from Western European governments underestimated the effect of the 12 Aarhus principles in their own countries. For example, one NGO participant from France, reflecting on the drafting and ratification of Aarhus suggested that At that time we got easy support from our governments; they thought it was a good way to destroy the iron curtain. It did destroy the curtain but it was also a boomerang. It came back. We then had to do it at home. But it was a very slow process…these people did not really take the Aarhus Convention seriously (European Environmental Bureau Board Member, 5 December 2011).
The Finnish Environment Minister at the time of the signing of Aarhus also noted that "Aarhus is not always meaningful for Finland but it is for the CEE countries and the green movement there….We should reach this kind of agreement on a global level" (Former Finnish Environment Minister, 12 September 2011) . One observer at the Aarhus MOP, referring to the UK government's stance towards Aarhus said "they never took Aarhus seriously. I think they thought it didn't apply to them" (Former NGO In-house Lawyer, April 11 th 2011). This is supported by some documentary evidence from the UK government. In their press release on the ratification the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) asserted that the Government was "satisfied that the necessary European and domestic legislation is in place to ensure complete coverage of the obligations under the convention throughout the UK" (cited in Macrory and Westaway 2011, 315 ).
There were undoubtedly multiple motivations for developing and ratifying a treaty on procedural rights in environmental issues. For NGOs, this was an opportunity to participate in an unprecedented way in environmental treaty-making but it also granted them the opportunity to enhance access to justice for environmental groups everywhere. For Western Europe elites, evidence from interviews and first hand accounts of the negotiations and ratifications suggests that many state participants thought that the main provisions of this treaty were already in place in their own jurisdictions and hence would mainly have the effect 13 of promoting environmental democracy abroad. The next section of this paper highlights how the procedural environmental rights contained within the Aarhus Convention were "brought home" in the UK by domestic NGOs.
Bringing Procedural Rights Home
The UK ratified the Aarhus Convention in 2005 and, as noted above, at that time "…compliance with Aarhus was not considered a significant challenge -the prevailing view was that the convention was largely aimed at the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe" (Macrory and Westaway 2005, 315 In short, as far as policy-makers were concerned the UK was already living up to its Aarhus commitments and the principles of environmental democracy underpinning the convention.
However, the following discussion illustrates the differing understanding NGOs in the UK had regarding the convention's significance "at home" in Britain and the way in which this has been deployed in legal mobilization efforts to re-shape the LOS in the field of environmental policy.
The following two intra-case studies trace changes in the LOS in two jurisdictions in the UK. Both the English law and Scots law systems have well-developed environmental laws (partly due to UK membership in the EU) and can be described as having good environmental legal stock. The standing of NGOs was established through case law in 14 England through a series of cases in the early 1990s. However, until recently standing for environmental associations was much more difficult to establish in Scotland. Both jurisdictions have also operated under a loser-pays costs system until about a decade ago when this began to slowly change, first in England and then in Scotland.
The first case study explores the ways in which environmental NGOs and their allies have used the Aarhus principles to challenge the cost rules in the English legal system. 
The Cost of Justice: England and Wales
For most NGOs interested in legal matters the most worrying element of accessing justice are the costs and risks associated with participating in legal activity. As one former in-house lawyer at Friends of the Earth pointed out, the problem with the English costs structure is a double one, of risk and uncertainty: "Not only do claimants risk paying the costs of the other side, but they also have no idea at the outset of proceedings whether, if they lose their case, they will have to find £5,000, £50,000 or £150,000" (Michaels 2004 …Scotland falls considerably short of meeting its international obligations.
Aarhus demands broad and affordable access to justice, but the reality in Scotland is very different. It can be extremely expensive to undertake legal proceedings (environmental or not) in Scotland… In addition, rules on standing -and the interpretation of these rules by the courts -are extremely restrictive, making it very difficult for individuals, communities and NGOs to demonstrate that they have "title and interest" to take an environmental case (Church 2011, 6 ).
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Among the NGOs examined here this research found that the key Scottish groups were involved in efforts to influence the LOS. Although RSPB had previously taken legal cases in Scotland it has been largely reluctant to do so since it incurred major costs in a legal case with WWF in 1998 (see Vanhala 2012) . The Head of Policy for RSPB Scotland said "we've learned we don't get access to justice" in speaking of that experience ( to stop the works on nearby sand dunes while her judicial review was in the court but was denied. In the 2010 decision the judge noted the Aarhus Convention and requirements to interpret the test of standing to be in line "with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice". However, the court found that Mrs Forbes, although a neighbour to the site, in living a kilometre from the works being carried out, had failed to show that she was "affected in some identifiable way" and did not demonstrate sufficient interest.
Paradoxically, the petitioner had not sought a PEO as they are confined only to public interest cases and she had been refused assistance with the costs of her case because her "application did not meet the "reasonableness" test for legal aid". According to the Scottish Legal Aid The campaigners continued to pursue the case in the Scottish Courts at that point. In 2011 Road Sense were granted a PEO that capped the campaigners' potential liability for the other side's costs at £40 000. In the ruling, which references the Aarhus Convention multiple times, the judge nonetheless took a subjective approach in assessing the amount at which the cap should be set. The cap was established at exactly the amount Road Sense estimated that they could raise from existing funds. In England, in Garner v Elmbridge Borough Council As for the substantive law, I think that the time has come to recognise that the private law rule that title and interest has to be shown has no place in applications to the court's supervisory jurisdiction that lie in the field of public law. The word "standing" provides a more appropriate indication of the approach that should be adopted (Hope L.J. para 62).
Lord Reed re-iterated the point:
In my opinion, the time has come when it should be recognised by the courts that Lord Dunedin's dictum [on title and interest] pre-dates the modern development of public law, that it is rooted in private law concepts which are not relevant in the context of applications to the supervisory jurisdiction, and that its continuing influence in that context has a damaging effect on the development of public law in Scotland. This unsatisfactory situation should not be allowed to persist (Reed L.J. para 171). Parliament. In doing so, they have begun to significantly shape the structure of opportunities for local groups and individual citizens to contest environmental policy decision-making.
There are now even discussions about establishing a specialist Environmental Court in Scotland which would represent another important shift in the Scottish LOS.
Conclusion
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The two-stage process-tracing analysis presented here helpfully highlights how an unintended outcome -the opening of the legal opportunity structure in both England and Scotland -came about. This research has traced the iterative process by which NGOs can influence the establishment of rights at the international level, then use these rights to expand access to the courts at the domestic level, then travel back to the international level to enforce this opening of the LOS when met with resistance. The social constructivist approach offers a theoretical framework for understanding the gap between meaning-making at the moment of commitment (the development and signing of the Aarhus Convention) and at the moment of compliance (the enforcement of the convention in domestic and supranational courts and in international tribunals) (Simmons 2009 ). In examining the longue durée one can begin to account for how the LOS was acted upon in this case to lead to changes that have been favourable for environmental groups interested in accessing justice. environmental NGOs have sought to redefine the idea of access to justice not being "prohibitively expensive" in domestic courts and before the ACCC and the CJEU. In both examples these processes of meaning-making by NGOs and courts contributed to a transformation of the structure of legal opportunities.
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This research contributes to the literature on law and social movements in general and research on LOSs specifically. Much research in this vein has tended to treat the LOS as an independent variable: that is, it focuses on how the LOS shapes the decisions social movement actors make in terms of using litigation as a tactic. This research highlights the merit in treating the LOS as a dependent variable as well: a factor that varies and can change over time. Taking these two understandings of the LOS together helps further develop our understanding of legal mobilization as a process that can have reciprocal effects between the activities of social movement agents and the institutional structures within which they are situated.
Future research could engage with these issues in a number of different ways that would be fruitful for the literature on law and social movements. An important first step concerns the further development of a theoretical approach to explain the conditions under which legal opportunity structures are likely to change (researchers could also distinguish between changes in terms of a LOS becoming either more open or more restrictive). The case presented here suggests a number of factors that may be important in explaining change that could be further explored in future research. This includes a) the existence of international procedural rights that can contribute to the opening of the LOS both substantively but also in the range of different groups have been able to access to demand changes; b) the presence of social movement actors that are able to play an entrepreneurial role in shaping access to justice through influencing the adoption of new procedural rights and helping to define the meaning of particular access to justice rights through campaigning and litigation activity and c) the willingness of courts and tribunals at different levels to play a role in expanding (or restricting) access to justice. However, only further comparative, cross-jurisdictional and cross-policy area research can determine the extent to which these, and other factors such as the type of legal system, may matter in explaining LOS change and stasis more generally.
